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I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth and evolution of technology over the last several
decades has met mixed reactions from the legal community. Generally,
courts have been forced to adapt old doctrines or adopt new ones to
encourage innovation in the fields of science and technology. Copyright
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law has changed significantly, since its eighteenth-century inception, to
account for technological advances while remaining true to its
constitutional mandate: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts . . . .”1 To further promote this progress, American courts have
carved out the “fair use” doctrine, which allows infringing uses that meet
certain criteria.2
The judicial expansion of the fair use doctrine, as part of a greater
effort to liberalize copyright law, is necessary to protect the growth of
innovation in a rapidly changing digital world. The federal copyright
statute enumerates four factors that courts should consider before
determining fair use.3 Courts have recently developed a limited market
analysis for determining the fourth fair use factor, “the effect of the
[unauthorized] use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”4 The controlling weight courts have given to the
effect of unauthorized uses upon the value of derivative works has
complicated this market analysis.5
As the wealth of online information increases, the search cost
associated with finding any particular piece of information rises. Thus,
the continued development of increasingly comprehensive search
1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For an interesting analysis of the Copyright clause,
see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771
(2006). Oliar argues that the “promote [] Progress” language is not merely a nonbinding
preamble, but a requisite limitation on congressional power. Basing his analysis on
records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Oliar provides three compelling
reasons for his limitation argument. First, Madison and Pinckney’s initial proposals for
the intellectual property clause granted plenary power to Congress; however, these
plenary grants of power were not ultimately adopted. Id. at 1776-77. Second, Madison
and Pinckney, both nationalists, supported a strong central government while other
members supported states’ rights. Id. at 1777. The fact that Madison and Pinckney were
both nationalists suggests that the intellectual property clause was the result of a
compromise between the nationalist drafters of the clause and the other members who
wished to limit Congressional power with the “promote [] Progress” language. Id. Third,
the “promote [] Progress” language was originally associated with proposals for
Congressional power to encourage innovation and to establish universities. Id. While the
Framers rejected these initial proposals, they retained the “promote [] Progress” language
for the intellectual property clause. Id.
2
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
3
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
4
§ 107(4).
5
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”); see
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see also Video Pipeline, Inc.
v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).
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engines and other online categorizers has become all the more vital for
Internet users. Recently, however, litigation over the availability of
copyrighted information on those search engines has blocked the
expansion of categorizers and indexers. To ensure the viability of these
categorizers, a virtual necessity in a complex maze of information,
copyright law must find a way to maximize categorizers’ efficacy while
retaining the creative incentives that copyright law provides copyright
owners. 6
Appellate courts have failed to provide consistent analyses with
respect to the fourth fair use factor.7 To ensure the continued growth of
technological innovation and equitable distribution of the fruits of
progress, courts should adopt a comprehensive fourth factor analytical
methodology. This comment provides such a methodology. My
suggested multi-step analysis requires courts to engage in an equitable
balancing of benefits and harms. I also suggest several universal
principles applicable to search engines and searchable databases to
identify the many benefits these navigational tools impart to copyright
owners.
The sections of this comment provide the background necessary to
understand the multi-step analysis. Part II discusses the Copyright Act of
1976 and the fair use exception, as well as several influential cases
affecting fourth factor analysis. Chief among these cases is Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.8 Although Justice Blackmun’s
circular definition of market harm in Sony is not controlling, it has been
highly influential. Part III discusses the conflict among the circuits
regarding cataloguing and its effect on the potential market for, or value
of, a copyrighted work.9 The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have upheld the
validity of categorizers under fair use, while the Third Circuit has found
that such categorizers do not merit fair use protection.10 Despite the
6
See Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the
Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179 (2001); Frank Pasquale, Breaking
the Vicious Circularity: Sony’s Contribution to the Fair Use Doctrine, 55 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 777 (2005).
7
17 U.S.C. § 107; David Nimmer, The Public Domain: “Fairest of Them All” and
Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use Fairy Tales, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003);
Pasquale, supra note 5; Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Cases, 1978-2005, http://www.bartonbeebe.com/documents/Beebe%20FU%20Precis.pdf.
8
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
9
I use “catalogue” or “categorizer” to refer to any system of information storage and
retrieval that attempts to organize data for ease of use. See infra Part III.A.
10
Compare Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
use of thumbnail images on a search engine constitutes a fair use) and Ty, Inc. v.
Publication Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that use of copyrighted
images in a collector’s guide may qualify as a fair use) with Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena
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agreement between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits, there still exists wide
disparity in the appellate courts’ application of the fourth fair use
factor.11 Part IV.A provides a comprehensive framework for analyzing
the fourth factor implications in any fair use case. Although the analysis
is rigorous, it is necessary to properly balance the equities involved. Part
IV.B examines search engines and categorizers in general to highlight
the unique benefits provided by these navigational tools. While search
engines and categorizers should be analyzed under the comprehensive
framework established in Part IV.A, these types of cataloguing systems
present particular benefits to society. Such benefits should always factor
into the inquiry and will often tilt the balance in favor of fair use.
Therefore, this comment provides a consistent method of fourth factor
analysis, which is necessary to preserve the benefits of Internet search
engines.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF FAIR USE AND FOURTH FACTOR PROMINENCE
Fair use is an exception to copyright infringement.12 In other words,
one who engages in fair use does not violate the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner.13 The statute provides four nonexhaustive factors that
guide courts in determining whether to permit the exception:

Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that use of clip previews
of motion pictures in a searchable database was not a fair use).
11
See infra Part III.B.
12
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
13
The Copyright Act of 1976 grants several exclusive rights to the owners of
copyrighted works.
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly;
and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.14

While the statute provides no hierarchy of importance among the four
factors, lower courts often adhere to Supreme Court dicta that the fourth
factor is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”15
Thus, it appears that the judiciary retains the power to mold the statutory
factors and emphasize different factors in the spirit of equity.
Although Congress codified fair use in § 107, it originated as a
judicially-created doctrine.16 Recognizing these origins, Congress left the
development of the doctrine to the judicial branch.17 Congress has
emphasized that “there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the
statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change . . . .
[C]ourts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a
case-by-case basis.”18 Because of the doctrine’s equitable nature and
case-by-case adaptability, fair use has been criticized as “so flexible as to
virtually defy definition.”19 To remedy this unpredictability, courts
should adopt a consistent application of the fourth fair use factor, “the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.”20 However, courts and academia have struggled to come to a
consensus regarding fourth factor application.
For example, in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document
Services, Inc.,21 the Sixth Circuit, in an en banc opinion, held that the
14
§ 107. The statute also provides several examples of fair uses. “[T]he fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified . . . , for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.” Id.
15
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
16
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
17
The 1976 amendment to the original Copyright Act was “intended to restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.” Id.
18
Id.
19
Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
21
99 F.3d 1381 (1996).
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defendant’s sale of “coursepacks”22 to students was not a fair use. In
coming to this conclusion, the fourth factor was decisive. Unlike its
competitors, defendant Michigan Document Services (“MDS”) did not
obtain permission from the copyright holders prior to printing and selling
its coursepacks.23 Applying the fourth factor, the Sixth Circuit cited
Supreme Court language that “to negate fair use . . . one need only show
that if the challenged use should become widespread, it would adversely
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.”24 The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that if copyshops across the country printed coursepacks and
refused to obtain permission fees from the copyright holders, such
widespread use would adversely affect the licensing market of the
publishers.25
This analysis was a major source of contention between the
majority and the dissents in Princeton University Press. The dissents
focused on a key criticism of fourth factor application: reliance on a
circular argument. Judge Ryan’s dissent summarizes the circularity as
stated by the original panel opinion: “Evidence of lost permission fees
does not bear on market effect. The right to permission fees is precisely
what is at issue here. It is circular to argue that a use is unfair, and a fee
therefore required, on the basis that the publisher is otherwise deprived
of a fee.”26 The dissent found the majority’s analysis flawed because the
majority first assumed that the copyright holders were entitled to license
fees from MDS, and then the majority found that a loss of these fees
rendered market harm to the copyright holders. By first finding that the
copyright holders were entitled to a licensing fee, the majority presumed
that which it was obligated to determine on the merits; the issue was
whether the use was fair, and if the use was fair then no permission fees
would have been required in the first place.
Similarly, the circularity issue was of prime importance in
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.27 In Texaco, the Second
Circuit held that photocopying of scientific and technical journal articles
for use by Texaco researchers was not a fair use.28 In its fourth factor
22
Coursepacks are similar to anthologies in that they contain excerpts from more
extensive works. However, the excerpts are not compiled by a publisher, but by a
professor who tailors the excerpts based on the particular course he or she is teaching.
23
Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1384.
24
Id. at 1386-87 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25
Id. at 1387.
26
Id. at 1407 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (citing Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan
Document Servs., No. 94-1778, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 7474, at *11 (6th Cir. Apr. 9,
1996)).
27
60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
28
Id. at 914.
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examination, the court found that only a few journal subscriptions had
been lost as a result of the copying, but large profits had been lost from
the market for licensing fees for individual articles.29 Although the
majority addressed the circularity problem, it attempted to circumvent
the harm by explaining that courts may only consider “traditional,
reasonable, or likely to be developed markets.”30 Therefore, the Second
Circuit concluded that the market for licensing fees was “reasonable or
likely to be developed” because such licenses could have been obtained
through the Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”).31
Despite the majority’s attempts to avoid the circularity criticism,
Judge Jacobs’s dissent pointed out several flaws. First, the CCC was
neither traditional nor reasonable and any possibility for development
was subject to obstacles.32 Second, the circularity of the argument was
not avoided: the market for licensing fees under the CCC cannot develop
unless the courts reject fair use arguments like Texaco’s, and the courts
cannot hold a particular use to be infringing unless there exists a market
that will be harmed.33 Thus, the majority first assumed that the publishers
were entitled to licensing fees through the CCC and the loss of those
licensing fees resulted in harm to the copyright holders’ market.
The conflicts regarding fourth factor circularity and licensing
markets first came to the fore in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.34 In Sony, the Supreme Court held that the use of the videotape
recorder (“VTR”) for timeshifting35 purposes constituted a fair use. In its
fourth factor analysis, the Court found that the VTR did not damage the
market for television programs, but actually enhanced the programs’
value by allowing for broader public access.36 By allowing viewers to
watch programs that they otherwise would have missed, the VTR
enhanced both the value of the programs and the value of the
advertisements shown during those programs.37
29

Id. at 930-31.
Id. at 930.
31
Id. The court noted that “[t]he CCC is a central clearing-house established in 1977
primarily by publishers to license photocopying. The CCC offers a variety of licensing
schemes . . . .” Id. at 929 n.16.
32
Id. at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
33
Id.
34
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
35
The Court explained “time-shifting” as “the practice of recording a program to
view it once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it.” Id. at 423. The Court went on to
note that “[t]ime-shifting enables viewers to see programs they otherwise would miss
because they are not at home, are occupied with other tasks, or are viewing a program on
another station at the time of a broadcast that they desire to watch.” Id.
36
Id. at 454.
37
Id.
30
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The Court conceded that some viewers might fast forward through
the commercials of the recorded programs, but ultimately any lost
advertising revenue due to fast-forwarding was more than offset by the
totality of the benefits conferred on the copyrighted works due to timeshifting.38 In essence, the Sony majority’s fourth factor analysis
recognized that both the negative and positive effects of an unauthorized
use should be considered.39 Yet the merits of this equitable balancing
approach faded into the background as lower courts adopted the more
restrictive view of market harm espoused by the Sony dissent.
Despite the Sony majority’s analysis of both the positive and
negative effects of the use upon the market, much deference has been
given to Justice Blackmun’s dissent. Justice Blackmun argued that the
fourth factor requires that “the infringer . . . demonstrate that he had not
impaired the copyright holder’s ability to demand compensation from (or
to deny access to) any group who would otherwise be willing to pay to
see or hear the copyrighted work.”40 The dissent, rather than taking a
comprehensive view of fourth factor analysis, narrowly defined the
inquiry and relied on circular logic.41 Justice Blackmun first assumed that
the use at issue was unfair and then determined that the unfair use
harmed the market for licensing fees. This analysis has been detrimental
to fair use determinations in subsequent cases like Princeton University
Press and Texaco because it first assumes that which must be
determined, whether the use is fair.42 Justice Blackmun’s approach is
also problematic because it constrains the fourth factor analysis to the
market for licensing fees. Any loss of licensing fees to the copyright
38
39

Id.

40

Id. at 453 n.36.
Pasquale, supra note 6, at 810.
First, the case considered not only the negative, substitutive effects of the
contested copying on the market for the copyrighted works, but also
examined the positive, complementary effects . . . . Second, Sony either
limited the range of “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed”
markets that could be claimed by the copyright owner, or determined that
negative effects on one market would likely be swamped by positive effects
in other markets – thereby leading to a fourth factor finding in favor of the
defendants. Either interpretation of the case expands the range of evidence
that must be considered before a court can deny a fair use defense.

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 485 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41
See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an
Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997).
42
Although it may be true that the burden to prove fair use does shift to the potential
infringer if the court finds the use to be a commercial use, Justice Blackmun’s dissent
would have the court place the burden on the potential infringer even before the
commercial use determination has been made.
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holder creates at least some economic loss, and if this is the only market
at issue, then the fourth factor will always cut in favor of the copyright
holder.43
The Sony majority’s broad approach to fourth factor analysis has
been undercut in subsequent lower court decisions by the circular logic
of Justice Blackmun’s dissent. The appeal of the circular argument flows
from the substantial profits that copyright holders could obtain through
licensing. Although the licensing revenues available to copyright holders
can, in many instances, be a major source of profit, courts should first
determine whether the copyright holder’s rights should extend into that
particular licensing market. This would allow the courts to avoid the
circularity evident in Princeton University Press and Texaco.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING CATEGORIZERS AND SEARCH
ENGINES/SEARCHABLE DATABASES
With the advent of the Internet and digital technology, the amount
of information available to the public has grown exponentially. However,
in order for society to make use of any type of information, there must be
mechanisms in place to facilitate that use. The mere presence of
uncategorized information breeds inefficiency and unnecessary search
costs. A library of random books placed in random piles, no matter how
extensive the collection, is of little use to society; in fact, the more
extensive the collection, the more frustrating the search for any particular
book. Thus, categorizing mechanisms are more necessary than ever
before to organize information and to provide an efficient means of
dissemination.
Although this article focuses on Internet search engines, the
fundamental disagreement among appellate courts can be framed as a
disagreement regarding fourth factor application to categorizers in
general. This disagreement has led to a circuit split over the fair use
status of categorizers. While the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have found
that categorizers are entitled to fair use protection, the Third Circuit has
held that categorizers do not merit such protection from the monopoly
rights of copyright holders. Pivotal to these decisions, as is the case in
most fair use decisions, were the courts’ methods of fourth factor
application. Disparities between the courts’ methodologies have led to
the current split.

43

“[I]t is a given in every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential
market if that potential is defined as the theoretical market for licensing the very use at
bar.” 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05(A)(4)
(2004).
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A. Seventh and Ninth Circuit Categorizer Cases—Laying the Foundation
for a Comprehensive Fourth Factor Analysis
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ty, Inc. v. Publications
International Ltd., addressed the fair use merits of a more traditional
categorization system and laid the groundwork for a concrete and
comprehensive fourth factor analysis.44 Ty, Inc., the manufacturer of
Beanie Babies, sued Publications International (PIL) for publishing a
series of books using images of the stuffed dolls.45 The district court
issued a permanent injunction prohibiting PIL from selling its books, and
awarded PIL’s profits from the sale of the books to Ty.46 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit limited its decision to whether PIL was entitled to a full
trial based on the fair use doctrine.47
Writing for the court, Judge Posner noted the benefits that public
criticism and exposure can bring to copyrighted works.48 As an example,
Judge Posner explained that book reviews provide useful guides for the
reading public, and quotations from copyrighted works in these reviews
have the potential to increase demand for the works.49 Clarifying the
economic rationale of the fair use doctrine, the court differentiated
between substitutive uses and complementary uses.50 The court explained
that nails and pegs function as substitutes for one another. Thus, if the
price of nails falls, consumers will be more apt to purchase nails over
pegs. While the relationship between nails and pegs is one of substitutive
uses, the relationship between hammers and nails is complementary.
Thus, if the price of nails falls, consumers have a greater incentive to
purchase hammers. Hammer manufacturers gain an economic advantage
when there is a healthy supply of cheap nails. Likewise, publishers gain
an economic advantage when their books are reviewed. Consumers are
unlikely to substitute their purchases of the actual books by reading a
book review. Rather, consumers are often enticed to purchase the book
after reading the book review.51 Book reviews facilitate both public
criticism and the profits of the publisher.
The court found that PIL’s books were complementary to Ty’s
products; rather than diminishing the market for Beanie Babies, the use
of the images in PIL’s books helped to create and expand that market.
44

292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 515.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 516.
48
Id. at 517.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 517-18.
51
Judge Posner, however, qualifies his analysis by stating that “owners of copyright
on the worst books” may be harmed by poor book reviews. Id. at 517.
45
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Although the use was complementary, a finding that would militate in
favor of fair use, the images were concededly derivative works protected
by the Copyright Act.52 Avoiding a remedial problem associated with
many fair use cases, the court chose not to declare every instance of
PIL’s use of the images as infringing. Rather, the court distinguished
among the different books at issue.53 The court concluded that the book,
For the Love of Beanie Babies, was directed toward a child audience and
contained commentary that was secondary to the images.54 However, the
court also concluded that the book, Beanie Babies Collector’s Guide,
was geared toward adults and contained far more substantive information
in addition to the images, information like the monetary value of the
Beanie Baby, its release date, and its retirement date.55 Beanie Babies
Collector’s Guide also accused Ty of frequent trademark
infringements.56
Judge Posner took note of Ty’s practices in issuing licenses for the
use of Beanie Baby images to publishers.
Ty doesn’t like criticism, and so the copyright licenses that it
grants to those publishers whom it is willing to allow to publish
Beanie Baby collectors’ guides reserve to it the right to veto any
text in the publishers’ guides. It also forbids its licensees to
reveal that they are licensees of Ty.57

The court found that this licensing strategy was akin to a book publisher
who utilizes licensing rights to prevent poor book reviews. Ty used its
licensing rights to potentially deceive consumers: although Ty could veto
any negative criticism of its products or practices by its licensees, Ty
represented to consumers that it did not have a hand in the licensees’
publications.58
In an attempt to convince the court that PIL copied more than
necessary to produce its guide, Ty argued that the books reproduced
images of the entire line of Beanie Babies, similar to a book reviewer
who reproduces the whole book.59 Yet, Judge Posner emphasized that a
52

Id. at 518-19.
Id. at 519.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 520.
57
Id.
58
The court noted that Ty’s “standard licensing agreement requires the licensee to
print on the title page and back cover of its publication the following misleading
statement: ‘This publication is not sponsored or endorsed by, or otherwise affiliated with
Ty Inc. All Copyrights and Trademarks of Ty Inc. are used by permission. All rights
reserved.’” Id.
59
Id. at 521.
53
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collector’s guide must be comprehensive in order to compete in the
marketplace.60 Because Ty licensed collector’s guides containing the full
line of Beanie Babies, a competitor would be pushed out of the market if
it could not provide the same comprehensive treatment.61 Ty further
argued that PIL could not publish any photos whatsoever, and would
have to be satisfied with a verbal description of the Beanie Babies.62 The
court found this argument unconvincing because such a requirement
would devastate the guide’s chances in the marketplace.63
Judge Posner articulated the fair use test in Ty as follows: “The
question is whether it would be unreasonable to conclude, with reference
to one or more of the enjoined publications, such as the Beanie Babies
Collector’s Guide, that the use of the photos is a fair use because it is the
only way to prepare a collectors’ guide.”64 Rather than mechanically
applying the four statutory factors, the Ty court primarily relied on the
purposes of the doctrine.65 However, the court did acknowledge that its
distinction between complementary and substitutive uses was related to
the fourth factor of the statutory test.66 Ultimately, the court held that the
district court erred by failing to apportion the original damage award
between the different texts based on the potential fair use implications of
each individual book.67 The court also directed that if Ty could prove
infringement on remand, it would not be entitled to all of PIL’s profits;
Ty would only be entitled to profits attributable to the infringing
images.68
The Ty decision is important to a revised fourth factor analysis
because it (1) attempted to comply with the original purpose of the
doctrine, (2) distinguished between substitutive and complementary uses,
and (3) apportioned damages based on the profits attributable to
infringing uses. The Seventh Circuit’s recognition of complementary
uses is akin to the Sony court’s consideration of the benefits that the VTR
provided for copyright holders. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit also properly

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 522.
65
In doing so, the court invoked the congressional intent that “‘courts continue the
common law tradition of fair use adjudication . . . [which] permits and requires courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the
very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’” Id. (quoting Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 524.
68
Id.
61
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balanced both the harms and benefits of a potentially infringing use in
Kelly v. Arriba Soft.69
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kelly v. Arriba Soft addressed the
fair use implications of images located on an Internet search engine.70
Search engines have become the standard tool for users to navigate
through the expanse of online information. Like the more traditional
categorizing device of the collectors’ guide from Ty, search engines
utilize copyrighted information to direct users to the original works.
Thus, they inherently complement the copyrighted work, fostering and
expanding the market for those works. Also similar to collectors’ guides,
search engines rely on comprehensiveness to attract users. A search
engine’s worth is measured primarily by its ease of use, speed, and its
ability to direct users to the sought after information while excluding
unwanted results. These measures of worth increase with increased
comprehensiveness, assuming that the speed of the search engine is not
adversely affected.
In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of thumbnail images71
of larger copyrighted images to display search engine results was
protected as a fair use. Arriba Soft operated an Internet search engine and
chose not to display the search engine’s results as text, but as thumbnail
images.72 Kelly, a professional photographer, sued Arriba Soft for
displaying his copyrighted works as thumbnail images on the search
engine’s results page.73 To create its results page, Arriba Soft developed
a “crawler” program that searched the web for images. The images were
then indexed onto Arriba Soft’s server and used to create the smaller,
lower resolution thumbnail images. The full-sized images originally
retrieved by the crawler program were deleted from Arriba Soft’s
server.74
In applying the fair use doctrine, the Ninth Circuit noted that fair
use “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute
when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
designed to foster.”75 Further, the court noted that the statutory factors
were not meant to be an exhaustive or definitive test, but were to be
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336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.
A thumbnail image is a lower resolution, miniature version of a larger image. Id. at

815.

72

Id.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 817 (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d
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applied with the purpose of the copyright statute in mind.76 As a result,
the Ninth Circuit’s determination provided a balancing approach in
which the benefits of the search engine outweighed any potential
negative implications to the copyright holder.77
Writing for the majority, Judge Nelson applied the four-factor
statutory test. On the first factor, “the purpose and character of the use,”78
the court found that the use was transformative. Rather than being
created for the purposes of artistic expression, the thumbnail images
served the purpose of “improving access to information on the internet
. . . .”79 Regarding the second factor, “the nature of the copyrighted
work,”80 the court found that the creative nature of the copyrighted work
weighed slightly in favor of Kelly.81 And as to the third factor, “the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole,”82 the court noted that “[i]f the secondary
user only copies as much as is necessary for his or her intended use, then
this factor will not weigh against him or her.”83
Addressing the fourth factor, “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,”84 the Ninth
Circuit emphasized the complexities associated with the analysis,
explaining that courts are obligated to analyze “not only the extent of
market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but
also ‘whether unrestricted and wide-spread conduct of the sort engaged
in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on
the potential market for the original.’”85 The court determined that
Kelly’s images were related to several markets.86 One of the markets was
the market of Internet users who would be attracted by Kelly’s
photographs to his website. The website also sold advertising space,
books, and travel packages.87 Another market was the licensing market,
in which Kelly could license his images to other sites or to a photo
database.88
76
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Id. at 822.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819.
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§ 107.
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Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820.
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§ 107.
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Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821.
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Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
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Of particular relevance to the fourth factor analysis was the fact that
users would have to access Kelly’s webpage for the full-sized image.89
Rather than prematurely finding that Arriba Soft’s use was detrimental to
Kelly’s licensing market, the court made the opposite finding - instead of
harming the market, the use of the images on Arriba Soft’s search engine
directed users to Kelly’s site.90 The thumbnails could not serve as a
substitute due to their lower resolution.91 No matter how widespread the
use of the thumbnail images, any such widespread use would not replace
the necessity of visiting Kelly’s website for the larger, clearer images.92
Although the court made clear that the poor quality of the thumbnails
was not necessarily a factor weighing in favor of fair use, in this
instance, the quality of the images was central to their value as
photographic images.93 An additional factor that influenced the fair use
determination was the fact that Arriba Soft did not sell or license the
thumbnails.94 The court held that the use of Kelly’s images as thumbnails
was not harmful to the market for, or value of, the images, and thus, this
factor worked in favor of a finding of fair use.95
Ultimately, the court found that factors one and four worked in
favor of Arriba Soft, factor three was neutral, and factor two weighed
slightly in favor of Kelly.96 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that the
thumbnails constituted a fair use.97 Despite the influence of Justice
Blackmun’s dissent in Sony, the Ninth Circuit did not require that “the
infringer . . . demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright holder’s
ability to demand compensation from (or to deny access to) any group
who would otherwise be willing to pay to see or hear the copyrighted
work.”98 Kelly proved to be a high-water mark for search engine validity
in which the court properly balanced the harms and benefits of the
unauthorized use on the market for the original work.
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Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 821 n.37.
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Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 485 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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B. The Third Circuit’s Finding Against Fair Use in Video Pipeline
The Third Circuit’s decision in Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Home Entertainment, Inc.,99 dealt a blow to the fair use status of
copyrighted material on search engines. The court’s decision illustrates
the flaws of fourth factor analysis as to “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”100 Although the
fourth factor analyses used by the Seventh Circuit in Ty and the Ninth
Circuit in Kelly were not structured enough to provide a legitimate
standard for uniform future application, the courts had at least taken steps
in the right direction. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits both recognized
the importance of distinguishing between substitutive and
complementary uses, and the inherent benefits that accrue to the
copyright holder when the use is deemed complementary. Further, the Ty
Court separated the potentially infringing uses by instrumentality, For
the Love of Beanie Babies and Beanie Babies Collectors’ Guide, and
limited the remedy of the copyright holder to the profits directly derived
from the infringing use as opposed to all profits that PIL had derived
from both books.101 Despite these key additions to the fourth factor
analysis, the Third Circuit failed to separate the fair use analyses of the
instrumentalities at issue in Video Pipeline and also fell victim to the
circular reasoning of the Sony dissent.102
In Video Pipeline, the Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s
preliminary injunction against Video Pipeline for the company’s
unauthorized display of Disney “clip previews” on its websites.103 From
the outset, Video Pipeline stood little chance of success due to the court’s
question-begging definition of “clip previews” as two-minute segments
from a video, displayed without authorization from the creator, and “used
in the same way as an authorized movie ‘trailer.’”104 This court-imposed
definition presupposed that the clip previews were “used in the same
way” as the derivative-work trailers.105 Thus, the court began by
assuming that the clip previews were not transformative, a first factor
determination which has a significant bearing on the outcome of the
fourth factor as well.106
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342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’n Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 524 (7th Cir. 2002).
Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d 191.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 198-200.
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Video Pipeline was originally granted a license to use Disney
trailers on promotional videos created by Video Pipeline for sale to retail
stores.107 However, in 1997, Video Pipeline began to use the Disney
trailers, along with its other licensed trailers, on its Internet sites.108
Video Pipeline then entered into agreements with retail websites to
provide the retailers with access to the Video Pipeline trailers.109 To
ensure that the retailers’ customers could not save the trailers on their
computers after viewing, the trailers were streamed, i.e. the videos could
neither be downloaded to nor stored on the customers’ computers.110
Among the retail websites that paid Video Pipeline for this service were
well-known media companies like Yahoo!, Amazon, and Best Buy.111
Despite the commercial nature of VideoPipeline.net, Video Pipeline
also operated VideoDetective.com, which consisted of a publicly
searchable database of previews.112 The database allowed visitors to
search for a movie by title, actor, scene, or genre and then provided
access to the trailers from VideoPipeline.net.113 In addition, when
searching for a particular video, the site provided a link to online retailers
that sold the video.114
Disney requested that Video Pipeline remove its trailers from both
VideoPipeline.net and VideoDetective.com, and the company promptly
acquiesced.115 However, Video Pipeline then replaced the deleted trailers
with its own two-minute previews, which contained scenes from the
original movies rather than from the trailers.116 The Third Circuit noted
that these “clip previews” were significantly different from the trailers.117
Disney emphasized that it also displayed its own trailers on the Internet
and used the presence of trailers on its websites to cross-promote other
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The Third Circuit found that
[e]ach clip preview opens with a display of the Miramax or Disney
trademark and the title of the movie, then shows one or two scenes from the
first half of the movie, and closes with the title again. Disney’s trailers, in
contrast, are designed to entice sales from a target market by using
techniques such as voice-over, narration, editing, and additional music.
Video Pipeline’s clip previews use none of these marketing techniques.
Id. at 195-96.
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products.118 For example, Disney had an agreement with Apple to
provide links to the Apple website.119
The Third Circuit began its fair use analysis by noting that it must
“bear in mind [copyright law’s] purpose to encourage ‘creative activity’
for the public good.”120 Additionally, the court claimed that its analysis
would “take into account where relevant Disney’s original full-length
films and its trailers” because “the statute directs [the court’s] attention
under factor four to the effect of the allegedly infringing uses on both the
potential market for any derivative works . . . and the potential market for
the originals.”121 Despite this initial declaration that the court would
engage in a principled fourth factor analysis of both the original works
and the derivative works, the court ultimately failed to follow its own
advice.
Writing for the court, Judge Ambro found that the first factor
weighed against a finding of fair use.122 It was clear that Video Pipeline’s
use of the clip previews was commercial in nature because the company
charged retail websites to stream its previews.123 As part of a first factor
inquiry, the court went on to examine whether the use was
transformative.124 Although the clip previews did not serve the same
purpose as the full length films, the clip previews did essentially serve
the same purpose as the derivative trailers.125 Invoking the rationale of
Judge Posner in Ty, the court emphasized that the clip previews were
substitutes rather than complements of the Disney trailers.126
Of relevance to the categorizer debate, the court attempted to
distinguish the Video Pipeline database from that in Kelly.127 Although
the Third Circuit noted that the thumbnail images used in Arriba Soft’s
search engine constituted a fair use, the court found that Video Pipeline’s
database did not serve the same purpose as Arriba Soft’s search
engine.128 The court stated:
As used with retailers’ web sites, VideoPipeline.net does not
improve access to authorized previews located on other web
118
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sites. Rather, it indexes and displays unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works. VideoDetective.com does permit viewers to
link to legitimate retailers’ web sites, but a link to a legitimate
seller of authorized copies does not here, if it ever would, make
prima facie infringement a fair use.129

The court’s failure to see the similarities between the two categorizers is
apparent from the initial description of the Video Pipeline database as
displaying “unauthorized copies of copyrighted works.”130 The court also
misinterprets the holding in Kelly.131 Rather than improving access to
“authorized” works on other websites, the Arriba Soft search engine’s
greatest asset, as in any search engine, was “improving access to
information on the internet.”132 Judge Nelson’s fair use finding in Kelly
was not predicated on the fact that the search engine only provided
results that were “authorized.”133 The improvement of access was the
essential finding that led to a finding in favor of Arriba Soft.134 Perhaps
the Third Circuit in Video Pipeline was not referring to the websites to
which the users of the Arriba Soft search engine were directed, but rather
to the results page which included the thumbnail images. If that was the
case, the Third Circuit’s analysis fails as well, because the results (the
thumbnail images) were “authorized” precisely because they were found
to be a “fair use.”135
In concluding that the first factor weighed against Video Pipeline’s
fair use defense, the court failed to analyze the nature of Video Pipeline’s
database.136 Rather than simply displaying individual clips, the web site
categorized all of its previews in terms of title, actor, scene, and genre.137
The structure within which the clip previews was situated, as a
categorizing mechanism, should have been evaluated by the Third
Circuit in its analysis of the first factor. Absent any further analysis into
the nature of the search engine’s structure, the first factor determination
against fair use crippled any hopes of a favorable fourth factor finding–
the use was determined to be commercial and the use was found not to be
transformative.
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As to the second fair use factor, the court determined that the
original motion pictures and derivative trailers were creative works.138 As
a result, these creative works were closer to the core of copyright
protection. Although Disney had not released all of its movies to the
public, the court concluded that the second factor weighed against a
finding of fair use.139
The court found that the third factor weighed in Video Pipeline’s
favor.140 Assessing the “amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” the court noted that the clip
previews consisted of only two minutes from the full length films.141
Additionally, the previews did not reveal the heart of the movies.142
Therefore, the amount copied was small enough to warrant a finding in
favor of Video Pipeline.143 It is important to note that this factor was
weighed as against the original and not the derivative work.144
Although the district court found that the fourth factor weighed
neither for nor against either party, the Third Circuit concluded that this
factor weighed against Video Pipeline.145 Citing Campbell, the court
emphasized that this factor “must take [into] account not only . . . harm
to the original but also . . . harm to the market for derivative works.”146
The court clearly understood its obligation to consider both the original
full-length films and the derivative trailers.147 In addition, the Third
Circuit noted that “the statute directs [the court’s] attention under factor
four to the effect of the allegedly infringing uses on both the potential
market for any derivative works . . . and the potential market for the
originals.”148 Despite this statutory mandate, the court ignored any
analysis of the effects on the original work.149 Dismissing, rather
offhandedly, the statutory mandate to balance the effect of Video
Pipeline’s use upon both the original work and the derivative works, the
court simply noted that
[b]ecause the issues pertaining to the potential harm to the market
for Disney’s derivative trailers are more straightforward, we
138

Id. at 201.
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107).
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focus our analysis on this area and do not review the District
Court’s conclusion as to harm to the market for the original fulllength films. It is in this context that we conclude that the fourth
factor weighs in Disney’s favor.150

As to the fourth factor, Video Pipeline made the initial argument
that no one would pay for trailers alone.151 This argument was easily
countered with evidence that retail websites had, in fact, paid Video
Pipeline for access to its previews database. The court emphasized that
Video Pipeline’s interpretation of fourth factor harm was too narrow.
Instead of considering only the effect on the market, the statute directed
the court to also consider the effect of the use on the value of the work.152
Despite this emphasis on the use’s effect on the value of the original
work, the court again failed to follow its own account of the relevant
legal standard.153 Rather than broadly analyzing Video Pipeline’s use on
the value of Disney’s films, which would include analysis of the benefits
accruing to Disney as a result of the unauthorized use, the court narrowly
analyzed the use and focused only on the loss of licensing revenues that
Disney might suffer as a result of the unauthorized clip previews.154
Disney introduced evidence that its use of authentic trailers on its
sites led to cross-promotional advertising with other retailers like Apple,
and the lure of the trailers was used to attract visitors to its own site,
which allowed Disney to sell its own products and obtain marketing
information.155 Based on these findings, the court concluded that the
infringing use would have a deleterious effect on the market for the
authentic Disney trailers.156
Reiterating the impact of its first factor analysis upon the fourth
factor, the court summarized by stating that the clip previews lacked
transformative quality and therefore, would act as substitutes for the
derivative work trailers. The court found that such a result would create
cognizable harm to the derivatives.157 The court noted that this
substitutive effect would result in retail websites using the services of
Video Pipeline rather than entering into direct licensing agreements with
150
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Disney.158 The court also found that Internet users searching for Disney
trailers may be drawn to websites utilizing Video Pipeline’s searchable
database rather than to Disney’s sites.159 Thus, the Third Circuit held that
“‘unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by [Video
Pipeline] . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the
potential market for the [derivative works].’”160
The strengths and flaws of the fourth factor analyses in each of
these cases, Ty, Kelly, and Video Pipeline indicate the need for a more
comprehensive and sound fourth factor analysis. Because the court in
Video Pipeline limited its fourth factor analysis to the effect of the use on
the market for the derivative trailers, it failed to consider the beneficial
aspects of the use as a result of its inclusion in a publicly available
searchable database.161 Although the market for derivative trailers was
most likely harmed by the use, the analysis should have been more
comprehensive, considering the effects upon both the derivative trailers
and the original films. This broader analysis would have been in keeping
with the Supreme Court’s Sony analysis of both the positive and negative
effects of the VTR. Additionally, the court’s fourth factor analysis did
not separate the potentially infringing uses by instrumentality, a
separation that would have required separate fair use analyses for
VideoPipeline.net and VideoDetective.com. This type of separation was
recognized by the Ty court as a means of providing the appropriate
measure of damages.162
The current climate of technological innovation and information
overload makes categorizers an absolute necessity. In an Internet-age
where information is most easily accessible online, the potential social
benefits of this ever-growing system can only be maximally harnessed if
the viability of search engines is not impeded by possible copyright
implications. The future of the fourth factor analysis will have a
significant impact on the development of search engines and on the risks
that firms are willing to take to provide the most efficient and socially
beneficial mechanisms of information navigation.
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IV. A MODEL FOURTH FACTOR ANALYSIS
While both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have found that
categorizers are entitled to fair use protection, the Third Circuit’s
decision in Video Pipeline has created a circuit split as to the legitimacy
of these categorizers. The inconsistencies inherent in the Seventh, Ninth,
and Third Circuits’ applications of the fourth factor analysis have made
future litigation unpredictable. Such unpredictability creates a potential
chilling effect on the development of online catalogues and indexers,
particularly in a climate of rapid technological innovation. A model
application of the fourth factor analysis to these cases should avoid the
circularity of the Sony dissent, which finds that every unauthorized use
immediately harms the potential licensing market and renders the fourth
factor an automatic plus for the copyright holder. Particularly, given the
nature of online categorizers and the advertising markets made available
through in-line linking,163 clear limits must be placed on copyright
holders to ensure that the temporary monopoly given to them is not
abused to the detriment of the copyright statute’s ultimate purpose, “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”164 A thorough and
searching inquiry into the markets for the original work as well as for
derivative works is necessary to appropriately balance the harms and
benefits to the original copyright holder.165 Anything less than this will
result in a skewed analysis based not on equitable rationales, but on
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The Ninth Circuit in Kelly described in-line linking as follows:
In-line linking allows one to import a graphic from a source website and
incorporate it in one’s own website, creating the appearance that the in-lined
graphic is a seamless part of the second web page. The in-line link instructs
the user’s browser to retrieve the linked-to image from the source website
and display it on the user’s screen, but does so without leaving the linking
document. Thus, the linking party can incorporate the linked image into its
own content.
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003)
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Sony majority noted Justice Stewart’s approach
to copyright ambiguities:
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
“author’s” creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. “The sole interest of
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly, this
Court has said, lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors.”
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (quoting
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975)).
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See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 975 (2002).
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preconceived judicial preferences for private commercial gains over
public access to information.166
The analysis requires that courts first divide any potentially
infringing uses by the instrumentalities that enable those potential
infringements. Then, after distinguishing between the potentially
infringing instrumentalities, the court must define the actual and potential
markets for the original work. The court must further define the actual
and potential market for derivative works. After determining both the
actual and potential markets for the originals and derivatives, the court
can finally determine how the unauthorized use in question has affected
those markets. A summary of the multi-step approach is provided in
Appendix A.
A. Developing a Multi-Step Inquiry
Several attempts have been made to revise the application of the
fourth factor, yet these revisions have not been adopted by the courts.167
These approaches either fail to consider the economic motivations of the
copyright holder or require too rigid an analysis, thereby undermining
the equitable nature of the inquiry. A multi-step approach would provide
a balance between judicial discretion and a greater degree of
predictability for copyright holders and fair use proponents.
The very nature of the fourth factor analysis necessitates a
comprehensive judicial inquiry. Courts must assess “the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”168 Prior
to examining the markets for the original or derivative works, the court
should first divide any potentially infringing uses by the instrumentalities
that enable those potential infringements. This step was taken by the
Seventh Circuit, resulting in differing damage calculations for the two
books at issue in that case. Although the copyright owner’s complaint
alleged that the potentially infringing publications involved in Ty were
both infringing uses, Judge Posner determined that only For the Love of
Beanie Babies infringed and that the use of Ty’s images in Beanie Babies
Collectors’ Guide was a fair use.
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Although a thorough and searching analysis of markets for the copyrighted work
may be undesirable due to the burden it places on courts, such a burden is not undue
because of the constitutional mandates at issue as well as relevant precedent. The
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After distinguishing between the potentially infringing
instrumentalities, the court must define the actual and potential markets
for the original work, which involves a value judgment as to whether the
original owner should be allowed to monopolize a potential market.169 In
doing so, the court must determine a number of potential markets for the
copyrighted work, which entails a speculative inquiry into markets the
copyright holder is likely to pursue.170 In order to contain the analysis of
potential markets, courts should first rely on the copyright holder’s
business model to determine the actual targeted markets. The Sony case
provides a prime example of this business model inquiry. The Sony
majority relied largely upon the factual findings of the district court in
regard to the markets at issue. The district court noted five markets that
were targeted in Universal’s business model: (1) theater, (2) television,
(3) network telecasts, (4) local telecasts, and (5) theater redistribution.171
The Court then noted that the primary revenue for Universal in running
its programs was through advertising revenues.172 As a result of VTR
time-shifting, more viewers were exposed to commercials than if the
VTR did not exist.173 The Court relied on empirical data demonstrating
that VTR copying was predominantly used so that viewers who were
unable to watch the shows could do so at a later time.174 Ultimately, the
most practical method of determining the potential markets for an
original work and derivative works should be based on the copyright
holder’s interpretation. Yet, the primacy of the copyright holder in this
regard should only be a rebuttable presumption. A claim by the copyright
holder that its copyright extends to any particular market can be rebutted
by evidence showing that it has no concrete basis for its assertion, i.e. no
plans to infiltrate that particular market or no research examining the
profitability of that market.
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Matthew Africa has noted:
It is more difficult to determine whether a copyright holder should
control the new market where the alleged infringer uses copyrighted
expression in a market that the copyright holder might not enter. The court
must determine prospectively whether the copyright holder should control
the market and if so, whether requiring a license is appropriate.
Matthew Africa, Comment, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New
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After defining the actual and potential markets at issue for the
original work, the court must then define the actual and potential market
for derivative works, which also involves a value judgment as to whether
the original owner should be allowed to monopolize the market. The
consequences of the potential derivative market analysis are particularly
acute in the case of online categorizers. In theory, a court could conclude
that any use of any frame of a movie on an online categorizer would cut
into the potential licensing market for the derivative market for film
frames. However, in this case, the correct question for the court is
whether the original copyright holder is likely to pursue an online market
for the placement of its film frames on searchable databases. More likely
than not, most producers of films are not in the business of producing
searchable online databases.
After determining both the actual and potential markets for the
originals and derivatives, the court must determine how the unauthorized
use in question has affected those markets. This analysis will further
require an analysis of not only the harms to the potential licensing
markets, but also the benefits that the use creates to the copyright holder.
Appendix B provides an example of how this analysis would apply to
Video Pipeline. Concededly, the numerical values that approximate the
net effect of each potentially infringing use on each market are arbitrary.
However, courts are left with the discretion to apply numerical values as
they see fit, guided primarily by the insight of valuation experts.175
Separate analyses are needed for each potential market of the original
work and for each potential market for derivative works. If there are two
instrumentalities at issue, the court must apply the “effect on the market”
analysis to each instrumentality.
B. Assessing the Benefits of Search Engines and Searchable Databases
At several points in the multi-step fourth factor analysis, courts are
required to weigh both the harms created by the unauthorized use and the
benefits that the use creates for the original works and derivative works.
To ensure that the circular approach does not continue to undermine the
equities involved in fair use cases, it is necessary for courts to consider
both the harms to the licensing markets created by unauthorized uses, as
well as the benefits conferred upon those works by the unauthorized use.
Although several theories have been posited to explain fair use policy,
175
Numerous market analysis companies retain valuation experts whose testimony
would serve as the basis for determining the effects of potentially infringing uses on the
market for a copyrighted work. See, e.g., Forrester Research, Inc.,
http://www.forrester.com/rb/; see also JupiterResearch, http://www.jupiterresearch.com/
bin/item.pl/home.
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they have either fallen into the circularity of the Sony dissent or fail to
consider the capitalist incentives inherent in copyright law.
Following the Sony decision, one of the most cited policy rationales
behind the fourth fair use factor is the market failure theory. This theory
posits that a party is barred from the fair use defense when “the
transaction costs involved in negotiating individual . . . licenses would
inevitably exceed the potential gains in trade available.”176 An alternative
theory analogizes the doctrine of fair use to that of eminent domain. This
eminent domain theory holds that supporting the purpose of the
Copyright Clause, to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,”177 is the superior motive of the fair use doctrine.178 Under this
theory, rather than allowing the copyright holder a monopoly on the
work, unlicensed uses are fair uses when they do not harm, or benefit, the
market for or value of the copyrighted work.179 Such harmless uses
would not entitle the copyright holder to “just compensation.”180
However, where the use does result in harm to the market for or value of
the copyrighted work, “just compensation” must be paid in the form of
money damages.181 Therefore, “courts [should] account for a copyright
holder’s lost licensing royalties in its analysis of market effect only if a
primary or derivative market for licensing the original work exists, and
only if the copyright holder is willing and able to exploit that market.”182
Search engines and other online searchable databases confer
substantial benefits upon the public, which should factor into a revised
fourth factor analysis. These categorizers are the sole providers of
metadata, or data about data, and are the primary navigational tools on
the Internet. Users rely on the comprehensiveness of these categorizers to
attain the information they seek. However, the ability of these search
engines to sift through the mass of information available online
inevitably collides with copyright law. As exemplified in Kelly, search
engines have difficulty determining which results are subject to
copyright limitations.183 Although there are mechanisms by which
176

Lunney, supra note 165, at 985.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
178
See Gregory M. Duhl, Old Lyrics, Knock-Off Videos, and Copycat Comic Books:
The Fourth Fair Use Factor in U.S. Copyright Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 665, 729-730
(2004).
179
Id. at 730.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
The Ninth Circuit noted that when Kelly objected to the use of his images on
Arriba Soft’s search engine “Arriba deleted the thumbnails of images that came from
Kelly’s own web sites and placed those sites on a list of sites that it would not crawl in
the future.” Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003). However,
177
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copyright owners can protect their sites from inclusion on search
engines, it is more likely that the search engines will return unauthorized
copyrighted results to users before the copyright holder has an
opportunity to protect his work from the use. However, in the case of
more deliberately constructed searchable databases like Video Pipeline,
the inclusion of copyrighted material is most likely within the knowledge
of the database creator.184 Nonetheless, in either case, public benefits
accrue as a result of public access to information facilitated by these
navigational devices.
Despite the public benefits that accrue to Internet users as a result
of the availability of information on search engines and searchable
databases, some harm may be done to the original copyright holders.
This harm is more prevalent in cases where an entire copyrighted
original work is capable of being accessed through the search engine.
Although Kelly only addressed the clearly transformative use of
copyrighted photographs into distorted thumbnail images, the court in
that case did not address the copyright implications of access to the fullsized versions of the photographs.185
However, in Video Pipeline, the court was only assessing the harms
that Disney faced as a result of short two-minute clips of its movies
displayed on VideoDetective.com; there was never the potential for a
user to download the entire movie.186 As a result, in Video Pipeline, for
users to access clip previews multiple times on VideoDetective.com,
they would have to access the database and type in the correct search
parameters.187 If users could simply download the clip previews once,
they would not have to go through the formal search process again and
would not be exposed multiple times to advertisements and links to retail
“[s]everal months later, Arriba received Kelly’s complaint of copyright infringement,
which identified other images of his that came from third-party web sites.” Id.
184
Video Pipeline originally obtained a license to use Disney trailers, but that license
was revoked when Video Pipeline began to display the trailers on its website. Video
Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2003).
185
The Kelly court stated that
[t]he second action involves the display of Kelly’s larger images when the
user clicks on the thumbnails. . . . [And] as to the second action, we
conclude that the district court should not have reached the issue because
neither party moved for summary judgment as to the full-size images and
Arriba’s response to Kelly’s summary judgment motion did not concede the
prima facie case for infringement as to those images.
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 817.
186
In fact, there was not even the potential for users to download the clip previews
onto their computers for later viewing. The Third Circuit recognized that the videos were
“streamed” to users and could not be downloaded or saved onto their computers. See
Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 195.
187
Id. at 195.
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providers of the videos being streamed. Thus, the inability to download
the clip previews could potentially result in multiple exposures to
advertising and marketing techniques, ultimately benefiting the owners
of copyrighted works available through the database.
Yet there is still the possibility that any work or derivative work
that is available on a searchable database could be subject to a license
agreement. However, even when there is the potential for such a
licensing scheme, the courts must first determine whether the copyright
owner’s protections should be allowed to enter into the market of
searchable databases. Surely, licenses would be required if the entire
work was available on the database. But when much shorter snippets of a
written work or a two-minute clip preview of a film are used, there is
room for equity to find against such an extension of the copyright
monopoly. As owners of copyrighted works demand licensing fees for
smaller segments of their original works, issues regarding the market for
derivatives necessarily come into play. In the context of online
categorizers and indexers, a finding that any small snippet of information
or film available on a database is subject to a license agreement would
cripple the ability of such databases to exist. Therefore, limits must be
placed on what will constitute a derivative work worthy of the copyright
owner’s monopoly power.188
If the efforts of searchable databases to attain an ideal of complete
comprehensiveness are quashed by copyright infringement suits, the
owners of the original copyrights will be working against their own
interests. As the Internet becomes ever more cluttered with information,
the search costs necessary to sift through the massive amounts of data
would impede any single user from finding the information he or she is
seeking. Therefore, the use of small bits of copyrighted material on
search engines is necessary so that users can recognize the location of the
information they seek and access that information. This creates benefits
for both users and copyright owners.
The creation of new information and the placement of that
information onto the Internet or into any library-like database has a
detrimental effect upon the underlying system. Unless the information is
organized in a way that makes it relatively easy for a potential user to
188

See William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property:
An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 382 (1999) (“The
commodity approach to intellectual property confuses the fact that a commodity may
have a market value with the existence of a legal entitlement to exercise monopoly
control over that commodity.”); see also Joanna Pearlstein, 403 Ways to Slice a CD,
WIRED, Mar. 2007, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/15.03/snackmusic.html#two
(noting that “Warner Music found 23 ways to market one South Korean pop star’s 16track album—for a total of 403 SKUs (stock keeping units)).
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find, the information is useless and simply clutters the landscape of
knowledge. This only makes it more difficult to find the copyright
owner’s information, as well as the information of every other participant
in the system. Thus, the search costs associated with the glut of available
information are a negative externality that results from copyright owners’
creations.189
Due to the nature of any catalogue, online or print, the inclusion of
any individual work has both positive and negative effects upon other
works included in the catalogue. As additional works are included, the
catalogue may gain popularity as a more exhaustive, and hence, a more
reliable source of information. Thus, more users are drawn to the
catalogue and the benefits to the copyright holder accrue accordingly.
Although the addition of works within a catalogue may diminish the
proportional share of total “space” allocated to any one work, the ensuing
popularity growth of the catalogue will, in many cases, outweigh any
proportional losses to the individual work.190 Inclusion of a work, or
reference to a work, in an online searchable database likewise carries

189

Frank Pasquale analogizes this informational pollution to environmental pollution:
Environmental laws force polluters to pay for the ways they reduce the
usefulness of air, water, and soil. Information law should adjust the rights of
content creators in order to compensate for the ways they reduce the
usefulness of the information environment as a whole. Every new work
created contributes to the store of expression, but also helps make it more
difficult to find whatever work a particular user needs or wants . . . .
Copyright law should take negative externalities like search costs into
account in its treatment of alleged copyright infringers whose work merely
attempts to index, organize, categorize, review, or provide small samples of
work generally. They are not simply “free riding” off the labor of copyright
holders, but rather are creating the types of navigational tools and filters that
help consumers make sense of the ocean of data copyright holders have
created.
Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privileging of
Categorizers, 60 VAND. L. REV. 135, 140-41 (2007).
190
As a catalogue gains in comprehensiveness, it may eventually be considered a
“definitive source.” As such, inclusion in a “definitive source” catalogue would provide
the copyright holder with marketability and reputational benefits. For example, as noted
in Video Pipeline’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court:
[Granger’s Index to Poetry] has been the “definitive source” in English for
locating a poem. . . . It’s most recent version . . . provides detailed indexing
of 55,000 works by poets such as Shakespeare and Shelley, as well as
modern writers like Gary Snyder, Seamus Heaney, and Adrienne Rich. It
covers all of Shakespeare’s sonnets, all of Ezra Pound’s cantos, the entire
Beatles’ songbook, and the works of such poet/songwriters as Patti Smith
and Bob Dylan.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (No. 03-763).
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with it significant social capital, which relies in no small part upon the
comprehensiveness of the database.191
The case of online databases like that of Video Pipeline, which
consisted of short two-minute clip previews, is particularly useful as a
means of boosting the popularity of the original work. Because films are
experience goods, or goods that consumers are not capable of placing
value upon until they have been experienced,192 “[w]hen consumers can
preview and browse works, they are far more likely to purchase them
than when the goods are essentially a black box.”193 The court in Video
Pipeline noted that “the clip previews do not constitute mere
‘information’ about the movies, as would, for example, a list of the
names of the actors starring in a film, or a statement of the rating it
received. If Video Pipeline was only dealing in this type of information,
the fair use doctrine might not be implicated at all; copyright protection
does not include facts and ideas, but only their expression.”194 However,
this analysis fails to consider that films are experience goods and that
therefore, the experience of only two minutes of the full-length film is
necessary to entice audiences to purchase the film.
Another potential benefit accruing to Disney from the existence of
the clip previews on the searchable database could have been the natural
exposure of users to Disney videos even when those users were not
particularly looking for Disney videos. Generally, the only users who
will view Disney trailers on the Disney website are specifically looking
at the Disney site and are targeting Disney merchandise. Yet, by placing
the clip previews on a searchable database, Video Pipeline also allowed
for those not primarily interested in Disney to view or be exposed to the
Disney product. This was accomplished by allowing users to search
according to various criteria including genre, actor, and title.195 For
example, if a user was a fan of Tom Hanks and was interested in
purchasing the film, “The Burbs,” the user would run a search for Tom
Hanks on the Video Pipeline database. “The Burbs” would appear as one
element in a list of Tom Hanks films, but so would Disney’s “Toy
191
Pierre Bourdieu defines social capital as “the sum of the resources, actual or
virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network
of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”
PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WAQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 119
(1992).
192
See
Hal
R.
Varian,
Markets
for
Information
Goods,
http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/japan/japan.pdf.
193
Pasquale, supra note 6, at 806.
194
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 199 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2003).
195
Id. at 195.
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Story.” Presumably, the user who has a particular penchant for Tom
Hanks may also be drawn to purchase the Disney movie as well. Users
searching for Tom Hanks films are unlikely to first search the Disney site
for references to Tom Hanks. The case would be the same for a user who
is interested in a particular holiday film but cannot remember the title to
the film. Using Video Pipeline’s database, the user could search under
“genre” for holiday movies. The user then might find a clip preview for
“The Santa Clause,” and upon realizing that this was the very movie the
user had been searching for, would purchase the film. Essentially, the
ability to use various searching criteria allows users to obtain a variety of
results that may lead to unexpected or unplanned purchases to the benefit
of the copyright holder.
Gregory Duhl has suggested an analysis that focuses on the public
benefits that accrue as a result of the unauthorized use.196 His approach
would replace the dichotomy between commercial and non-commercial
uses with an analysis of the public versus the private benefits of the use.
Invoking the constitutional basis of copyright to promote benefits to the
public through creativity, Duhl argues that when an unauthorized use
benefits the market for the original, only public uses should be deemed
fair. Because almost any use can be construed to provide financial gain
to the alleged infringer the commercial/non-commercial dichotomy is
often unclear. Therefore, the public/private dichotomy is more useful to
determine whether an unauthorized use supports the constitutional
mandate.197 Because VideoDetective.net was an interactive catalogue
open to public use, it should have been assessed for that benefit, in
keeping with the constitutional mandate. In fact, as noted in
VideoPipeline’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, their catalogue is used
by public library systems in Seattle and Denver “to promote the public’s
access to their video collections.”198
On a broad scale, access to information promotes the public welfare
and it is the purpose of copyright law to promote creative activity for the
public good. As the Internet has allowed information to become more
easily accessible and centrally located, search engines have become the
keys to accessibility. Yet the availability of small portions of copyrighted
information on search engines will continue to be problematic until a
comprehensive fourth factor analysis is adopted by the courts.

196
197
198

Duhl, supra note 178, at 734-35.
Id. at 734-35.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (No. 03-763).

2007]

Copyright Implications of Searchable Databases

559

V. CONCLUSION
My proposed methodology provides a comprehensive approach to
the statutorily mandated fourth factor analysis. While the approach
recommended by this article does not purport to lead to a fair use finding
for every use of every search engine, it does provide a framework to
preserve the benefits that search engines provide. The multi-step
examination is necessary to resolve the inconsistent analyses of the
fourth factor. Although it may be true that the individual categorizers at
issue in Ty, Arriba Soft, and Video Pipeline were distinguishable on the
facts, the analyses instituted by the courts differed significantly.
Particularly in the area of search engines and searchable databases,
consistency of fourth factor application is essential to preserving the
great benefits that these categorizers provide to Internet users. Thus, by
focusing on both the harm to the markets of copyrighted works as well as
the abundance of benefits, including public benefits, that accrue from the
proliferation of search engine technology, this new approach comes
closer to a realization of copyright’s original mandate.
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APPENDIX A: MULTI-STEP FOURTH FACTOR ANALYSIS
Step 1: Separate the potentially infringing instrumentalities
Instrumentality A
Instrumentality B
Step 2: Determine the potential markets for both the original work and
derivative works
Potential markets for the original work:
Market 1
Market 2
Potential markets for the derivative work:
Market 1
Market 2
Step 3: Assess the net effect of the potentially infringing uses upon the
potential markets
Instrumentality A
Potential markets for the original work:
Market 1 Æ Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 1 for the
original work
Market 2 Æ Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 2 for the
original work
Potential markets for the derivative work:
Market 1 Æ Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 1 for the
derivative work
Market 2 Æ Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 2 for the
derivative work
Instrumentality B
Potential markets for the original work:
Market 1 Æ Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 1 for the
original work
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Market 2 Æ Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 2 for the
original work
Potential markets for the derivative work:
Market 1 Æ Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 1 for the
derivative work
Market 2 Æ Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 2 for the
derivative work
Step 4: Determine the final effect of each use upon the potential market
for or value of the original work
Instrumentality A
Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 1 for the original work
Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 2 for the original work
Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 1 for the derivative work
+ Net effect of instrumentality A on Market 2 for the derivative
work
= Final effect of instrumentality A upon the potential market for or
value of the original work
Instrumentality B
Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 1 for the original work
Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 2 for the original work
Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 1 for the derivative work
+ Net effect of instrumentality B on Market 2 for the derivative
work
= Final effect of instrumentality B upon the potential market for or
value of the original work
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APPENDIX B: MULTI-STEP FOURTH FACTOR ANALYSIS APPLIED TO
VIDEO PIPELINE
Step 1: Separate the potentially infringing instrumentalities
Instrumentality A – VideoPipeline.net
Instrumentality B – VideoDetective.com
Step 2: Determine the potential markets for both the original work and
derivative works
Potential markets for the original work – Films:
Movie theater market
Television market
Home video/DVD market
Potential markets for the derivative work – Online Clip Previews:
Retail in-store video compilations market
Online licensing and cross-promotional advertising market
Step 3: Assess the net effect of the potentially infringing use on the
potential markets
Instrumentality A – VideoPipeline.net
Potential markets for the original work – Films:
Movie theater market Æ Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on Market
1 for films = +1
Television market Æ Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on Market 2
for films = +1
Home video/DVD market Æ Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on
Market 3 for films = +1
Potential markets for the derivative work – Online Clip Previews:
Retail in-store video compilations market Æ Net effect of
VideoPipeline.net on Market 1 for clip previews = 0
Online licensing and cross-promotional advertising market Æ Net
effect of VideoPipeline.net on Market 2 for clip previews = -2
Instrumentality B – VideoDetective.com
Potential markets for the original work – Films:
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Movie theater market Æ Net effect of VideoDetective.com on
Market 1 for the original work = +1
Television market Æ Net effect of VideoDetective.com on Market
2 for the original work = +1
Home video/DVD market Æ Net effect of VideoDetective.com on
Market 2 for the original work = +2
Potential markets for the derivative work – Online Clip Previews:
Retail in-store video compilations market Æ Net effect of
VideoDetective.com on Market 1 for the derivative work = 0
Online licensing and cross-promotional advertising market Æ Net
effect of VideoDetective.com on Market 2 for the derivative work = -2
Step 4: Determine the final effect of each use on the potential market for
or value of the original work
Instrumentality A – VideoPipeline.net
Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on movie theater market for the film
= +1
Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on television market for film = +1
Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on home video/DVD market for
film = +1
Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on retail in-store video compilations
market for the derivative work = 0
+ Net effect of VideoPipeline.net on online licensing and crosspromotional advertising market for the derivative work = - 2
Æ Final effect of VideoPipeline.net on the potential market for
or value of the original work = +1
Instrumentality B – VideoDetective.com
Net effect of VideoDetective.com on movie theater market for the
film = +1
Net effect of VideoDetective.com on television market for the film
= +1
Net effect of VideoDetective.com on home video/DVD market for
film = +2
Net effect of VideoDetective.com on retail in-store video
compilations market for the derivative work = 0
+ Net effect of VideoDetective.com on online licensing and crosspromotional advertising market for the derivative work = - 2
Æ Final effect of VideoDetective.com on the potential market
for or value of the original work = +2

